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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to§§ 78A-3-
102( 4), 78 A-4-103(2)O), UCA (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
Appellant's Issue No. 1: 
Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the agreement the parties 
entered into when it failed to consider the final and complete expression of their 
bargaining as a contract? Did it err in granting summary judgment for Appellee? 
6 
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Standard of Review for Issue No. 1: 
"We accord a trial court's interpretation of a contract no deference and review it 
for correctness. "The interpretation of a written contract is first a question of law 
determined by the words of the agreement. ... Accordingly, whether an ambiguity 
vP exists is also a question of law to be decided by the trial court before considering 
extrinsic evidence." Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 294 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
with no deference to the trial court. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,I 6, 177 P.3d 600 
Supporting Authority: 
In accordance with Utah's well-settled principles of contract interpretation, 
the interpretation of a contract is controlled by the intentions of the parties. Central 
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ,I 12, 40 P.3d 599. We 
determine the intentions of the parties by first looking within the four comers of 
the agreement. Id. Provided that the language within the four comers of the 
agreement is unambiguous, we look no further than the plain meaning of the 
contractual language. Id. We consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions 
only if the contractual language is ambiguous. Id. We find ambiguity in the 
language only if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id. 
(internal citations omitted) 
Generally, formation of a contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ~ 24,276 P.3d 1178. An offer 
is a "manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify 
7 
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another person in understanding that his assent to the bargain is invited and will 
conclude it." Id. "For an offer to be one that would create a valid and binding 
contract, its terms must be definite and unambiguous." Id. The obligations of the 
parties must be "set forth with sufficient definiteness that [the contract] can be 
performed." Id. "An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that 
an objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully 
enforceable contract has been made."ld. "Consideration is present when there is an 
act or promise given in exchange for the other party's promise."ld. "Thus, 'there is 
consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers 
a detriment, however slight."' Id. (internal citations omitted) 
In order [ f]or the terms of another document to be incorporated into the 
document executed by the parties, the reference must be clear and unequivocal, 
and must be called to the attention of the other party, [the party] must consent 
thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be known or easily 
available to the contracting parties ... .Jnterwest Const. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 97 
n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 17 A C.J.S. Contracts' 299 (1963)). 
Preservation of Issue No. 1: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Rl 76) 
8 
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Robertson's Declarations, (R283) and Robertson's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (RI I 09) 
Appellant's Issue No. 2: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of FWB after 
FWB cancelled the ACH line without cause? Did that make the consideration 
promised an illusory promise? Did the trial court err in not considering the breach 
of good faith and fair dealing in regards to the new loan documents entered into? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 2: 
A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) In an appeal from the grant of 
summary judgment, "[a]n appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions 
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there from in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,I 6, 177 P.3d 600 "Summary 
judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions, and inferences which when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the losing side establish that 'there is no 
ViP genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
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judgment as a matter oflaw."' Rose v. Allied Dev.' Co., 719 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah 
1986) 
Supporting Authority: 
"following the rule of law that where two or more instruments are executed 
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of the 
same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together so far as determining the respective rights and interests of the 
parties, although they do not in terms refer to each other." Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 501 P. 2d 266 - Utah: Supreme Court 1972 
"first breach" rule "a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of 
contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform." Jackson 
v. Rich, 499 P .2d 279, 280 (Utah 1972). "He can neither insist on performance by 
the other party nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent 
failure to perform." Id. 
[ f]or the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute 
the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on both parties. 
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such 
vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to nothing, 
10 
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the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory." An illusory promise, neither binds 
the person making it, nor functions as consideration for a return promise. Peirce v. 
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, il 21, 994 P .2d 193 
Preservation of Issue No. 2: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Rl 76) 
Robertson's Declarations, (R283) and Robertson's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (Rl 110, 1111) 
Appellant's Issue No. 3: 
Did the trial court err when it failed to consider the issues of whether the 
requirements under Utah Code Title 57, Chapter 1, in regards to foreclosures had 
been complied with and if the language of the required notice was responsible for 
confusion, causing a cooling of the bidding process? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 3: 
~ "We review a [ trial] court's interpretation of a statute for correctness." 0 'Dea v. 
Olea, 2009 UT 46, iJ 15, 217 P.3d 704. 
"Because we resolve only legal issues in reviewing a summary judgment, we give 
no deference to the [district] court's view of the law; we review it for correctness." 
11 
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Franco v. Church o(Jesus Christ o{Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ~ 32, 21 P.3d 
198 
Supporting Authority: 
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we determine only whether the 
[ district] court erred in applying the governing law and whether the [ district] court 
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ryan v. Dan's 
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395,400 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
"Our primary objective when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ~ 12,240 P.3d 780 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). To discern legislative intent, we begin by examining a 
statute's plain language and construing it "in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will authorize the setting aside 
of the sale must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and 
causing an inadequacy of price. The remedy of setting aside the sale will be 
applied only in cases which reach unjust extremes."Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. 
RealtyServ ..• Inc. 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987) 
12 
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Preservation of Issue No. 3: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (RI 79-180) 
VP 
and Robertson's Declarations. (R285-286) 
Appellant's Issue No. 4: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the Appellee on the 
issue of breach of contract when the Appellant presented a prima facie case for 
breach of contract which should have been sufficient for summary judgment as a 
matter of law for Appellant? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 4: 
We review a grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, affording 
the trial court no discretion, and we view all the facts and reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, 
~ 6, 177 P.3d 600. Whether a contract exists between parties is ordinarily a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Supporting Authority: 
13 
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The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are "( 1) a contract, 
(2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the 
other party, and (4) damages" Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20 ,I 14, 20 
P.3d 388 
The formation of a contract is spelled out in Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 
101, ,I 24, 276 P.3d 1178. Generally, formation of a contract requires an offer, an 
acceptance, and consideration. Id. An offer is a "manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his 
assent to the bargain is invited and will conclude it." Id. "For an offer to be one 
that would create a valid and binding contract, its terms must be definite and 
unambiguous." Id. The obligations of the parties must be "set forth with sufficient 
definiteness that [the contract] can be performed." Id. "An acceptance is a 
manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an objective, reasonable person is 
justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract has been made."ld. 
"Consideration is present when there is an act or promise given in exchange for the 
other party's promise."ld. "Thus, 'there is consideration whenever a promisor 
receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however slight."' Id. 
(internal citations omitted) 
The effects of a failure of consideration are spelled out in Aquagen Int'/, Inc. 
v. Calrae Trust. 972 P.2d 411,413 (Utah 1998) The formation of a contract 
14 
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"requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and a consideration." Id. Consideration sufficient to support the 
formation of a contract requires that "a performance or a return promise must be 
1.$) bargained for. 11 Id. ("Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in 
exchange for a promise .... For the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral 
contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be 
binding on both parties."). Id. When one party to a valid contract commits an 
"uncured material failure" in its performance of the contract, the non-failing party 
is relieved of its duty to continue to perform under the contract. Id. This general 
rule is based on the principle: that where performances are to be exchanged under 
an exchange of promises, each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be 
called upon to perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the 
l,:j expected exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of 
performance by the other party. Id. We have unequivocally held in the past that 
11 
[ e ]vidence of fai_lure of consideration does not vary or alter the terms of a 
contract; it attacks the very existence of the contract for the purpose of proving it 
unenforceable." Id. In fact, it is entirely permissible for a party to rescind a contract 
based on a failure of consideration. Id. "'Failure of consideration [as opposed to 
lack of consideration] exists wherever one who has either given or promised to 
give some performance fails without his fault to receive in some material respect 
15 
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the agreed exchange for that performance."' If a failure of consideration occurs, 
the contract ceases to exist. Id. (Internal citations omitted) 
Preservation of Issue No. 4: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (RI 76) 
Robertson's Declarations, (R283) and Robertson's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (RI 109-1113) 
Appellant's Issue No. 5: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the Appellee on the ~ 
issue of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when Appellant 
presented evidence that Appellee impeded his performance and made it difficult or 
impossible for him to further perform under the covenant? Appellee's interference 
with and failure to cooperate in Appellant's performance was in bad faith. This is a 
clear breach under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Appellant 
should have been granted summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 5: 
We review a grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, affording 
the trial court no discretion, and we view all the facts and reasonable inferences in 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, 
,I 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
Supporting Authority: 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the covenant) inheres in 
every contract. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,I 18, 173 P.3d 865 As 
distinguished from a contract's express terms, the covenant "is based on judicially 
recognized duties not found within the four comers of the contract." Id. "Under 
[the covenant], both parties to a contract impliedly promise not to intentionally do 
anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract." Id. 
~ Furthermore, the "covenant ... should prevent either party from impeding the 
other's performance of his obligations [ under the contract]; arid ... one party may 
not render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and then 
take advantage of the non-performance he has caused." Id. (Internal citation 
omitted) 
[T]he question of whether parties who retain express power or discretion 
under a contract can exercise that power or discretion in such a way as to breach 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We believe that they can. Our courts 
have determined that a party must exercise express rights awarded under a contract 
reasonably and in good faith. Olympus Hills Shopping Center. Ltd. v. Smith's Food 
17 
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& Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), courts have determined 
in a variety of contexts that a contracting party can exercise a retained contractual 
power in bad faith. Id. 
Preservation of Issue No. 5: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (RI 76-178) 
and Robertson's Memorandum in Suppmt of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
(R1113-1114) 
Appellant's Issue No. 6: 
Did the trial court err when it excluded evidence the Appellant attempted to 
produce for impeachment? 
Standard of Review for Issue No. 6: 
First, to the extent the issue on appeal required the trial court "to interpret 
rules of civil procedure, it 'presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness."' Harris v. JES Assocs .. Inc., 2003 UT App 112, iJ 25, 69 P.3d 297 
( citation omitted) 
Two standards of review exist for reviewing questions regarding the 
admissibility of evidence. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 6200 South Assocs., 872 
18 
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P.2d 462, 465 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "With respect to the trial court's selection, 
interpretation, and application of a particular rule of evidence [ or procedure], we 
apply a correction of error standard. When the rule ... requires the trial court to 
viJ balance specified factors to determine admissibility, 'abuse of discretion or 
reasonability is the appropriate standard."' Id. ( citation omitted); 
Supporting Authority: 
Rule 26(a)(4) states: "A party shall provide to other parties the following 
information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for 
impeachment." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) (emphasis added). Impeachment ofa 
witness is defined as the act of "discredit[ing] the veracity of a witness." Black's 
Law Dictionary 768 (8th ed.1999) (parentheses omitted). Similarly, "impeachment 
~ evidence" is defined as "[ e ]vidence used to undermine a witness's credibility." Id. 
at 597. Thus, by the rule's plain meaning, witnesses need not be disclosed if the 
sole purpose of their testimony is to call into question the "veracity" or 
"credibility" of another witness. Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs .• 
LLC ~29, 154 P .3d 865 (2006) 
"[b ]efore a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under rule 3 7, the 
court must find on the part of the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, ... 
19 
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fault, or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process. 11 Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997) 
Preservation of Issue No. 6: 
This issue was preserved in Robertson's Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (Rl 105-1108) 
CONTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
57-1-23 UCA 
57-1-24 UCA 
57-1-25 UCA 
57-1-26 UCA 
57-1-27 UCA 
57-1-31.5 UCA 
26 URCP 
56(c) URCP 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: 
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This case stems from an agreement entered into by the parties on or about 
May 1, 2009. It concerns their .rights and obligations under the contract and their 
duty to act in good faith towards each other. Both parties contend the other party 
~ breached their agreement. Many of the questions here are about the actions of the 
parties after the alleged breach. 
Course of proceedings: 
Appellee filed complaint 08/23/2011. 
Appellant filed answers and counter claim 10/11/2011 
Motions for summary judgment were considered on 03/21/2013 and granted 
for Appellee, denied for Appellant. 
Trial held on issues of amount owed and value of the property on date of the 
foreclosure on 07/02/2013. 
Rule 59(a) Motion for New Trial oral arguments held on 12/09/2013 and 
denied. 
Disposition of trial court: 
In the trial court the final Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
was entered May 27, 2015. (Memorandum I) 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
In April of 2006, Appellant (Robertson) approached Zions Bank with the 
idea of processing payments using electronic checks for those in the jewelry 
industry. Robertson was informed about National Automated Clearing House 
Association transactions (referred to as ACH). Robertson applied for these services 
with Zions Bank. (R280) 
Jay Knight was an officer of Zions bank and had discussions with Robertson 
about them while employed there. When Knight left Zions Bank and became 
employed as an officer of Appellee, Far West Bank (FWB), he contacted 
Robertson and solicited his business with the offer that FWB could provide the 
ACH (electronic check) services quicker than Zion's Bank would if he would 
move his account over to them. Relying on that promise, Robertson moved his 
banking services to FWB in July 2006. (R281) 
FWB agreed to provide ACH services for Robertson which started on July 
26, 2006. (R281) 
Shortly thereafter, FWB agreed to provide a line of credit to Robertson in 
the amount of $230,000 (Rl 1) to help in establishing the business known as 
Instapolypay and securing the ACH line. Robertson began utilizing these services 
and created a business based on them. (R281) 
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In October 2006, the line of credit was increased to $500,000. (R24 )On 
September 12, 2007, an additional line of credit in the amount of $250,000 was 
established. (R28) 
Pursuant to the agreement, Robertson timely made each and every required 
payment. (R282) 
On August 15, 2008, the relationship began to break down. FWB, without 
cause, informed Robertson that it no longer wished to continue the business lines 
~ of credit and requested that the loans be paid off in full. Robertson informed FWB 
that he did not have the means to pay them off in full and negotiations on a 
VD repayment method commenced. (R282) 
On October 14, 2008, Robertson signed an ACH Origination agreement 
\110 prepared and demanded by FWB. (R458-460) 
On February 19, 2009, a formal demand letter was sent from FWB for 
vJD Payment in full on both lines of credit. (R289-291) 
On April, 20, 2009, FWB terminated the ACH Origination Agreement 
v.iP entered into on October 14, 2009 according to its terms by written letter. (Rl 129) 
The parties had a meeting on April 22, 2009 and terms for restructuring the 
debt and ACH were discussed. (R283) 
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On April 23, 2009 a new business loan and note were presented to 
Robertson for his consideration. Robertson declined to sign advising FWB by 
email that the terms on the new agreement were not in accordance with the 
discussions held the previous day. (R293) (Addendum II) 
Further negotiation took place by email (R293, 295) (Addendum II) 
On April 30, 2009, Robertson requested the terms of the current negotiation 
be placed in writing. (R295) (Addendum 11) FWB then presented Robertson with a 
final signed and written agreement that said, "Mike, Upon completion of the new 
loan documentation, we will reinstate your ACH line. Thanks, Dan Brian." (R297) 
(Addendum 111) 
With that assurance and promise, Robertson agreed to the terms and signed 
the new business loan and note documentation on May 1, 2009. (R46-51) 
Robertson performed on that agreement and timely made every payment 
required, including the September 2010 payment. (RI 76) (R283) Far West 
stipulated that this was correct. (R 13 61, P 12) 
On September 22, 2010 FWB again terminated the ACH processing services 
provided to Robertson by letter. (R299) 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As FWB anticipated and desired, without the income provided by the ACH 
service, Robertson was unable to perform on the business loan and note and failed 
to make any additional payments after that time. (R301) 
Far West, in continuing with their plan, then commenced a foreclosure 
action. (R303-304) The Notice of Default and Notice of Sale included a metes and 
bounds legal description encompassing all four parcels of property but also 
included the phrase, "The Real Property tax identification number is 23-051-
0004". This was only one of the four parcels (R59-60, 62-63, 65, 69-70). 
The Utah County Recorder only recorded a Notice of Default upon this 
~ single parcel before the sale and failed to record it on the other three parcels 
(R3 l 1-314) 
More than two weeks before the sale Robertson requested a written payoff 
as provided under Utah Code 57-1-31.5 but never received one (R308-309). 
The property was sold at foreclosure on June 1, 2011 to FWB for a credit bid 
of $135,000 and $268,000. (R6) 
Later, this deficiency action was commenced. (Rl-80) Robertson filed a 
response listing several defenses and also filed a counter action including breach of 
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R84-107) 
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A hearing was held on March 21, 2013 to obtain rulings on FWB' s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R1361) 
The Court ruled that the contract between FWB and Robertson was simply a 
return to the previous October 14, 2008 agreement and its later cancelation was in 
keeping with the terms of that agreement. (R1361, P49-50) 
The Court also addressed the claim by Robertson as to issues with Utah code 
57-1 and simply concluded that the legal description was the legal description. 
(R1361, P49) The Court dismissed Robertson's counter claim and granted FWB's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R1361, P50-51) and set a trial date to 
resolve the issues of the amount owed on the day of the sale and the value of the 
property on the date of the sale. (R1361, P51) 
A trial was held on July 2, 2013 on these issues. Robertson had filed a 
motion to reconsider that had been fully briefed but the Court refused to consider 
the motion because it had not been submitted for a decision before trial. (R1362, 
Pl 0-11) 
Robertson asked for clarification in opening arguments about what he would 
and would not be able to present and the Court informed him that as to the matters 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of amounts and values he could "present all the evidence you want". Robertson did 
not object to the presentation of evidence by FWB, believing the Court's 
instruction that he would be able to put on all the evidence he wanted. (R 13 62, 
~ Pl 1-12) 
When FWB presented their expert witness, Travis Reeves, to establish a 
value of the property on the date of the sale, Robertson attempted to present 
impeachment evidence. FWB objected under URCP 26(a)(3)(c) and the Court 
~ sustained that objection. {Rl362, P77) Robertson was unable to present the facts 
and obtain equal justice even though URCP 26 provided that the evidence he tried 
to introduce was proper and should have been allowed. (Addendum V) 
Robertson made a Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial on September 12, 2013. 
{Rl 102) That motion was denied on December 9, 2013. {Rl363) The final order 
was signed and entered May 27, 2015. (Rl3 l 7) (Addendum I) Robertson now 
appeals the district court's decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the agreement the parties entered 
into and also when it granted summary judgment to Appellee. There were many 
facts on the record that attest to the true nature of the agreement and what 
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constituted the final expression of the parties. The Appelle exercised bad faith 
when they terminated the consideration they had promised and caused great harm 
to the Appellant and impeded his performance. These facts merit summary 
judgment in favor of the Appellant rather than the Appellee. 
The trial court also erred in issues with interpretation of statues and rules and 
in applying the relevant law. The correct interpretation of these should have 
favored Appellant rather than disadvantaged him. 
ARGUMENT 
1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
WRITTEN CONTRACT AND ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DETERMINATION THAT THERE WAS NO MATERIAL FACT IN 
DISPUTE AS TO BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In determining whether to grant summary judgment, it is inappropriate for 
the district court to weigh disputed material facts and make credibility 
determinations. See Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete Cnty., 2002 UT 1 7, ,I 24, 42 
P.3d 379 ("A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact 
exists."); Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, ,I 14,239 P.3d 519 ("[W]eighing 
credibility and assigning weight to conflicting evidence is not part of the district 
court's role in determining summary judgment."). 
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There are several disputed material facts that the district court weighed in 
granting summary judgment to FWB. The court erred in doing so. 
I. WAS THE WRITTEN EMAIL FROM DAN BRIAN A CONTRACT 
OR SIMPLY AN ORAL AGREEMENT 
Robertson presented evidence that the parties were not in agreement prior to 
April 30th , 2009. (R293, 295)(addendum II) The previous ACH Origination 
agreement was cancelled on April 20th, 2009. (R l l 29)A new business loan and 
note were prepared by FWB and presented to Robertson on April 23 rd, 2009. (R42-
5 l) Robertson did not agree to these and questioned their terms. An email 
exchange took place discussing terms, amounts, fees and the ACH agreement. 
~ (R293, 295) (Addendum II) Finally, on April 30, 2009, Robertson requested FWB 
put in writing the final agreement and Robertson could then either accept it, or 
reject it. (R295) Robertson received back a written offer from FWB that was 
signed by Dan Brian. This written and signed agreement consisted of a single 
sentence, yet constituted everything the parties had bargained for that read: 
"Mike, Upon completion of the new loan documentation, we will 
reinstate your ACH line. Thanks, Dan Brian." (R297) (Addendum III) 
Robertson accepted the offer and completed the new loan documentation the 
following day, accepting all the terms contained therein, and tendered a check in 
vJ the amount of $100,461.58, (Rl 127) as his consideration. Far West pledged to 
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reinstate the ACH line as their consideration. The terms are definite and the 
obligation of both parties, as stated, can be performed. Any reasonable person is 
justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract has been made. (R283) 
(RS 18-519) (Rl 361-P25-31) (Addendum III) 
An integrated agreement is defined as II a writing or writings constituting a 
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement. 11 Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 209 ( 1981 ). 
Robertson's understanding was that this agreement contained the final expression 
of the parties and the Business Loan Agreement and Promissory Note was simply 
memorandum by which part of the contract could be proved and should be read 
and construed together so far as determining the rights and interests of the parties. 
"following the rule of law that where two or more instruments are 
executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times 
in the course of the same transaction, and concern- the same subject 
matter, they will be read and construed together so far as determining ~ 
the respective rights and interests of the parties, although they do not 
in terms refer to each other." Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d 
266 - Utah: Supreme Court 1972 
FWB contended that this written and signed document was simply an oral 
agreement and inconsistent with the Loan Documents and the Utah Statue of 
Frauds. (R335-339) 
Whether the writing was intended by the parties to be an integration is a 
question of fact. 
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A trial court's determination as to whether a contract is integrated is a 
question of fact. See Cantamar, L.L. C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 
321,iJI 1, 142 P.3d 140 
The district court weighed the evidence and made a finding of fact that the terms of 
vff) the written document were simply parol evidence, and that what the parties 
intended was a return to a previous agreement. (RI 361, P49-50) 
II. There was a question of material fact as to the intentions of the 
parties and the nature of their agreements and if they were 
integrated 
Robertson stated in his affidavit that FWB had promised ACH services in the 
beginning of their relationship in 2006. His whole reason for leaving his banking 
relationship with Zions bank was because of FWB 's promise to provide this 
service. Robertson stated that this service started in July of 2006 and continued 
throughout the whole course of their relationship until it was terminated by FWB 
on September 22, 2010. (R299) He also stated that the loan agreements of 2006, 
2007, and 2009 were all tied to the ACH agreement. (R281-283) Robertson argued 
~ that the course of conduct showed this and likened it to planting an orchard. The 
bank agreed to supply the water and he planted all the trees with the loan and now 
they are cutting off the water but still expect to get paid by the fruit. Once you cut 
off the water, (ACH), the trees die. (Rl361, P29) 
"following the rule of law that where two or more instruments are executed 
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of 
the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read 
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and construed together so far as determining the respective rights and 
interests of the parties, although they do not in terms refer to each other." 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d 266 - Utah: Supreme Court 1972 
Robertson stressed that the course of dealing and applying the law tied the ACH 
and business loan agreement together and that the respective rights and interest of 
the parties were to be construed together. (R5 l 9) 
FWB claimed that the ACH started in 2008 well after the 2006 and 2007 
loans were made. {Rl361, P14) They also argued that "There is no written 
agreement that contains language that supports any claim linking the Loan 
Documents with the ACH Origination Agreement or any claim that the written 
documents were modified". FWB insisted that the writings were an integration and 
asked to apply the parol evidence rule. (R337-338) 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing that is before the court is an 
integration and asks the application of the parol evidence rule, the court must 
determine as a question of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt a 
particular writing or writings as the final and complete expression of their 
bargain. In determining the issue of the completeness of the integration in 
writing, evidence extrinsic to the writing itself is admissible. Parol testimony 
is admissible to show the circumstances under which the agreement was 
made and the purpose for which the instrument was executed. Id. 
Robertson contended that the present matter was very similar to this matter in 
Bullfrog and disputed that the loan documents FWB cited were an intergration and 
also cited Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, ,I 14, 92 P.3d 
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768. and Cantamar. LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ~ 11, 142 P.3d 140 
(Rl 361,P37) 
It was error on the part of the district court to resolve these issues in 
summary judgment. 
III. The district court erred when it determined that the final agreement 
l.{d) the parties came to was simply a return to a previous document 
After much deliberation, (Addendum II) FWB offered a new agreement to 
Robertson that simply stated: "Upon completion of the new loan documentation, 
we will reinstate your ACH line." (R297) (Addendum III) Robertson accepted this 
new agreement and completed the new loan documentation. The district court 
determined that what was meant was a return to a previous document the parties 
had entered into and placed the burden on Robertson to negotiate out terms of the 
lo@ old document. (R 1361, P49-50) Robertson believed that the new document 
supplanted the old. (R 13 61, P3 l) 
"[R ]egardless of whether the parties may have had preliminary 
agreements about a given subject during the course of negotiations, we 
will assume that a writing dealing with the same subject was intended by 
the parties to supercede any prior or contemporaneous agreements." 
Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, if 14, 92 P.3d 768. 
No where contained in this writing, prepared and signed by FWB, does the 
agreement notify Robertson that the terms of the prior document are to apply. 
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While that does not mean that parties can't incorporate another document by 
reference, whether the simple term "reinstate" was sufficient to do so, as ruled by 
the district court, is also in question. 
Admittedly, parties may incorporate the tenns of another document 
by reference into their contract. Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling 
Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Yet, the terms 
of another document cannot be incorporated by reference without 
specific language. Rather, "the reference must be clear and 
unequivocal, 11 and alert the non-drafting party that terms from another 
document are being incorporated. Id. Additionally, the party "must 
consent thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be 
known or easily available to the contracting parties." Id. 
There are no documents showing consent to the terms of the old agreement by 
Robertson. The only documents Robertson signed and entered into were the new 
loan documents which say nothing of the ACH line and were the addendum to this 
final agreement that proved the contract. If the term "reinstate" is ambiguous, 
Robertson, as the non-drafting party, should have the benefit of defining the term. 
Could an independent third patty consider the phrase, "we will reinstate your ACH 
line" to mean a return to the position the parties were in before their disagreement 
began? This was the meaning Robertson gave the term and thus there was no 
reason to negotiate out a right of termination, because none existed before their 
disagreement. 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even if you took the district court's opinion that the writing was intended to 
include the previous document, it could only do so for the intended purpose stated. 
"if a written contract refers to another writing for a particularly 
designated purpose, the other writing becomes a part of the 
contract only for the purpose specified," 17 A C.J.S. Contracts 
§402(Westlaw database updated Mar. 2015); 
The only purpose specified was to reinstate the ACH line. 
IV. Could the previous ACH agreement even serve as consideration for 
an executory contract 
The October 14, 2008 written ACH agreement contains this clause: "This 
Agreement may be terminated on a ten day written notice by either party" (R214) 
thus giving FWB an arbitrary right to terminate the contract. 
The promisor, by reserving an arbitrary right to terminate the contract, 
can unilaterally negate his promises. Thus, a negatable promise does 
not constitute consideration for a return promise for an executory 
contract. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P. 2d 
I 028 - Utah: Supreme Court 1985 
The district court acknowledged that Robertson believed the consideration 
promised in entering into the new agreement was the reinstitution of the ACH. 
(R1361, P25) IfFWB could negate that promise at any time, it can not constitute 
consideration. This case is similar to the one in Aquagen International v. Calrae 
Trust, 972 P.2d 411 (1998) in the Utah Supreme Court. 
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When one party to a valid contract commits an "uncured material failure" in 
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty to 
continue to perform under the contract. Id._ This general rule is based on the 
principle: 
that where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of 
promises, each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called 
upon to perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the 
expected exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of 
performance by the other party. Id. 
We have unequivocally held in the past that "[e]vidence of failure of 
consideration does not vary or alter the terms of a contract; it attacks the 
very existence of the contract for the purpose of proving it unenforceable." 
ld._In fact, it is entirely permissible for a party to rescind a contract based on 
a failure of consideration. Id. 
'"Failure of consideration [as opposed to lack of consideration] exists 
wherever one who has either given or promised to give some performance 
fails without his fault to receive in some material respect the agreed 
exchange for that performance."' ld._lf a failure of consideration occurs, the 
contract ceases to exist. Id. (internal citations omitted) 
This case is also similar to Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ,r 19, 994 P.2d 193; 
We have stated that "courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant 
one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a contract." Id. 
In addition, we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the 
circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract. Id. Moreover, where 
there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable 
result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is 
no other reasonable interpretation to be given it. Id. 
We have held that[t]or the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral 
contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be 
binding on both parties. When there exists only the facade of a promise, 
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i.e., a statement made in such vague or conditional terms that the person 
making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be 
"illusory." An illusory promise, neither binds the person making it, nor 
functions as consideration for a return promise.[5] Id. It has also been noted, 
however, that [t]he tendency of the law is to avoid the finding that no 
contract arose due to an illusory promise when it appears that the parties 
intended a contract. Through a process of interpretation, in the absence of 
express restrictions, courts find implied promises to prevent a party's 
promise from being performable merely at the whim of the promisor. Id. 
(Internal citations omitted). 
Thus, under the district court's interpretation of the agreement, no consideration 
existed upon which to create an enforceable contract. FWB would retain an 
~ unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of their performance. If they 
could terminate their consideration simply with a written 10 day notice, there is no 
promise. Their promise to the contract is an illusory promise and attacks the very 
contract itself. 
V. Was there a modification of terms in the new agreement 
Even if the district court was correct and the parties were to return to the 
previous written agreement, there is a question as to if those terms were modified 
by the new agreement. 
"Even though a binding contract is made before a contemplated 
written memorial is prepared and adopted, the subsequent written 
document may make a binding modification of the terms previously 
agreed to." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 cmt. d ( 1981) 
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Robertson was required under the new business loan agreement, under the 
Continuity of Operations clause, to agree not to "( 1) Engage in any business 
activity substantially different than those in which borrower is presently engaged, 
or (2) cease operations, liquidate, merge, transfer, acquire or consolidate with any 
other entity, change ownership, dissolve or transfer or sell collateral out of the 
ordinary course of business." (R48) And under the promissory note, under 
Required Deposit Account; "Borrower agrees to maintain an active deposit account 
with American West Bank during the term of this agreement. Failure to do so shall 
be deemed a default of this agreement and subject to the default interest rate and 
annual percentage rate." (R43) Thus any right Robertson may have had under the 
old agreement to terminate had been modified by the new agreement. Robertson 
believed FWB had pledged the ACH line as consideration for his entering into the 
new loan documentation that was to run at least as long as the new note and thus, 
any right to terminate the old agreement had also been modified. 
These are all disputed questions of fact and should have been submitted to 
the fact finder and not resolved in summary judgment. 
2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DETERMINATION THAT THERE WAS NO MATERIAL FACT IN 
DISPUTE AND SHOULD HA VE APPLIED AN OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS BEFORE REACHING A 
DECISION AS TO GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
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The allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference with the same force and effect as if set forth in full below. 
"Whether party has breached covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
generally factual issue to be determined by factfinder, not issue subject to 
resolution as matter of law." Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Ctrs .• Inc., 889 P .2d 452, (Utah Ct. App. 1994) "question of whether party 
has acted in bad faith in connection with covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
generally question of fact." Id. "if dispute exists concerning duty of good faith as 
to why contractual parties did what they did, there is question of fact for jury." Id. 
(internal citations omitted) 
"whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual 
issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." Republic 
Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285,291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of FWB 
against Robertson's claim of the breach of good faith and fair dealing as a matter 
of law. There were several disputed issues of material fact in question. 
Robertson cited Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,I 18, 173 P.3d 865 
as a similar case to this one, and as to the determination of what legal duties each 
party has under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R1361, P33-36) 
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The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the covenant) 
inheres in every contract. Id. As distinguished from a contract's 
express terms, the covenant "is based on judicially recognized duties 
not found within the four comers of the contract." Id. "Under [the 
covenant], both parties to a contract impliedly promise not to 
intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the 
benefits of the contract." Id. Furthermore, the "covenant ... should 
prevent either party from impeding the other's performance of his 
obligations [under the contract]; and ... one party may not render it 
difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and then 
take advantage of the non-performance he has caused." Id. Generally, 
whether a party to a contract has acted reasonably "is an objective 
question to be determined without considering the [party's] subjective 
state of mind." Id. "[B]reach of the covenant of good faith and fair Gi::rJ 
dealing is an objective question.". Id. Typically, the duties imposed by 
the covenant, "unlike the duties expressly stated in the contract, are 
not subject to alteration by the parties." Id. the duty to perform 
contract in good faith cannot be waived by either party. Id. (internal ~ 
citations omitted) 
It is undisputed that on April 30, 2009, Dan Brian of FWB presented a written 
offer by email to Robertson. (R297) (Addendum III) It is undisputed that the 
following day Robertson complied with the terms of that offer and entered into the 
note and business agreement. (R42-5 l) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing ~ 
would then adhere to each party of this agreement. 
I. The cancelation of the ACH line deprived Robertson of the benefits 
of the contract 
Robertson argued in his previous argument that the whole purpose for moving 
to FWB was to obtain ACH services for his business, Instapolypay. The course of 
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dealings show the benefit Robertson sought was the ACH service. The offer made 
by FWB to induce Robertson to enter into the new loan documents was the 
restoration of the ACH line. The cancelation of the ACH line on September 22, 
~ 2010 (R299) deprived Robertson of the benefit he had bargained for and thus 
breached the covenant. FWB argued that they had only exercised a contract right. 
Even if that was correct, they still had to exercise that right according to the 
covenant. 
[T]his court held that even where a contract expressly provides a 
privilege to one party, the exercise of that right is subject to the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 
UT App 379, ,I 20, 173 P.3d 865 "[A] party must exercise express 
rights awarded under a contract reasonably and in good faith." Id. [A] 
party breaches the covenant if it fails to exercise all rights under the 
contract reasonably. Id. Where the contract allows discretion but does 
not provide any express standard for exercising that discretion, the 
covenant imposes an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. "[T]he 
degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the 
covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have 
defined their expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of 
discretion through express contract terms." (internal citations omitted) 
[T]he question of whether parties who retain express power or 
discretion under a contract can exercise that power or discretion in 
such a way as to breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
We believe that they can. Our courts have determined that a party 
must exercise express rights awarded under a contract reasonably and 
in good faith. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Centers. Inc., 889 P.2d 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), courts have 
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determined in a variety of contexts that a contracting party can 
exercise a retained contractual power in bad faith. Id. 
Thus the district court should have used an objective standard of reasonableness 
to determine if FWB violated the covenant when it terminated the ACH line. This 
is a contested question of fact. 
II. The cancelation of the ACH line made it difficult or impossible for 
Robertson to perform on the note and business agreement 
Robertson relied upon the funds generated from the ACH agreement to make 
payments on the 2009 Note and Business loan. (R301) FWB knew that without 
funds from this ACH agreement, Robertson could not make those payments. FWB 
acted in Bad Faith in terminating the ACH agreement without cause. Markham 
states that the covenant "should prevent either party from impeding the other's 
performance of his obligations" and "one party may not render it difficult or 
impossible for the other to continue performance" Id. FWB's actions made it 
difficult or impossible for Robertson to perform on the loan without the income 
obtained by the ACH line thus impeding his performance. Summary judgment 
against Robertson was inappropriate. 
3 THE COURT ERRED IN IT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH TITLE ~ 
57 CHAPTER 1 AND IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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The allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference with the same force and effect as if set forth in full below. 
Did Far West comply with all provisions of Utah Code Ann. Title 57 
Chapter 1? (R524) FWB 's complaint is based on this chapter. Robe1tson presented 
many questions of material fact in regards to compliance with the provisions of this 
l.eJ) chapter that were never addressed by the trial court in granting summary judgment. 
I. Was there a valid default to invoke the power of sale 
Robertson raised the question as to whether he was in default of the deed of 
trust after FWB breached their agreement. (R5 l 2-5 l 3,517) 
"first breach" rule "a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of 
contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform." 
Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1972). "He can neither insist on 
performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other 
party for a subsequent failure to perform." Id. 
By canceling the source of repayment for the contract after promising to provide it 
in the agreement the parties entered into, FWB committed a material breach. This 
nullified any further performance by Robertson. 
("The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract 
excuses further performance by the nonbreaching party. Also, a party 
seeking to enforce a contract must prove performance of its own obligations 
under the contract." ( citation omitted)); Bell v. Elder, 782 P .2d 545, 548 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Robertson is not and has never been in default under the agreement entered into 
after FWB 's breach and FWB has not proved performance of its own obligations 
under the contract. The notice of default issued by the Trustee was in error and 
substantially affected and sacrificed the interests of the debtor. (R 1 78) Because 
of this breach, the Trustee had no authority under Utah Code Ann. 57-1-23 
through 57-1-28 (as amended) to sell the property. (R515) 
II. FWB failed to properly notice the property and did so in a way to 
cause great confusion, which resulted in a cooling of the bidding 
process. 
Robertson argued that the trust property contained four distinct parcels of 
property as contained in the trust deed. (R14, R102) FWB was aware of the fact 
that there were four distinct parcels. The Substitution of Trustee, (R53, 56) Notice 
of Default, (R59, 62) Notice of Trustee's Sale, (R65, 69) and publication of sale, 
(Rl 79) all contained a single legal description which encompassed all four parcels 
along with the statement, "The Real Property tax identification number is 23-051-
0004", the tax number of only a single parcel. (Rl 02, 179) Most vacant property 
lacks an actual street address and the easiest way to identify a parcel is with the tax 
identification number. Robertson argued that this was a cause of confusion that had 
a dramatic cooling effect on the bidding process. 
This would be similar to a borrower who owned four distinct houses that 
were contiguous and in default. If the trustee listed a single legal description 
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encompassing all four houses, but listed at the end of that legal description the 
address of the least valuable house at one end of the block and failed to list the 
street addresses of the other three, including the most valuable one at the other end 
of the block as part of the sale, it would have a tendency to cool the number of 
bidders who might want to participate in the sale. 
The listing of this single tax identification number caused enough confusion 
that the county recorder, the expert on metes and bounds legal descriptions, only 
placed a Notice of Default upon this single parcel of property. (R285, 311-314) 
The Notice of Sale required to be posted by Utah code 57-1-25(1)(b)(ii) was also 
only posted on this single parcel. (R285) 
Any reasonable person of ordinary prudence, with due diligence, who may 
have been looking for foreclosed property to buy, would only have been able to 
believe they could bid on the property with the tax ID 23-051-0004 from the 
information posted and published. If they would have searched the County 
property records further and found that Round Peak owned four contiguous 
parcels, they would have found that there was no record of a Notice of Default 
listed against the properties with tax ID 23-008-0020, 23-008-0021, or 23-008-
0022. If they would have visited the property they would have found that the 
Notice of Sale was only posted on the property with tax ID 23-051-0004. (Rl 79) 
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Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will authorize the setting aside 
of the sale must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding 
and causing an inadequacy of price. The remedy of setting aside the sale will 
be applied only in cases which reach unjust extremes."Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Sec. Realty Serv., Inc, 7 43 P .2d 115 8, 1159 (Utah 1987) 
If the description FWB placed on these required notices was confusing enough to 
cause the county recorder to record the notice of default only on the single parcel, 
could it also have caused an ordinary person to likewise believe that only that 
single parcel was for sale and thus cause a chilling effect in the bidding process? 
Could a reasonable jury conclude that the effect of placing a single tax 
identification number on the notice have caused a chilling effect on the bidding 
process? If so, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
III. Plaintiff failed to follow the terms of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.5 
On May 16, 2011 a Payoff Statement Request was made to Steven W. Call, 
(R308-309) Trustee, by Robertson as to the total amount required in order to pay 
off the loan and a detailed description of all charges associated with the payoff as 
provided in Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.5. This request was made in a timely 
manner and no response was given. (Rl 72) 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31.5 (Addendum IV) states in pertinent part: 
(2)(a)(i) An interested party may submit a written request to a trustee for 
a statement of the amount required to be paid: 
(A) to reinstate an obligation secured by a trust deed; or 
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(B) to pay off a loan secured by a trust deed. 
(2) ( c )(ii) If, after scheduling a trustee's sale, the trustee fails to provide a 
requested payoff statement within five business days after the request is 
received, the trustee shall: 
(A) cancel the trustee's sale; or 
(B) postpone the trustee's sale to a date at least 10 business days after 
the trustee provides the statement. 
There are only two options the trustee has if he has not complied with the timely 
written request for a payoff. That is to (a) cancel or (b) postpone the sale. 
On the date of the sale, the trustee made the following statement: " Is there 
~ anyone here who has any knowledge or objects to the proceeding of this sale on 
the basis that there has been a bankruptcy case commenced against the borrower or 
that the sale of this property is precluded by state or federal law, please speak 
now". (R285) Robertson informed the trustee that a payoff statement had been 
requested from him and had been delivered to his office over two week before and 
that no payoff statement had been provided. (R285) Nevertheless, the trustee 
continued to proceed with the sale knowing that the payoff statement required by 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.5 had not been provided. 
IV. The Trustee failed to follow Utah Code§ 57-1-27 
Robertson argued that the trust property contained four distinct parcels of 
property as contained in the trust deed. (R14, R102) Utah Code§ 57-1-27 
~ (Addendum IV) states in pertinent part: 
( 1 )(a) The trustor, or the trustor' s successor in interest, if present at the sale, 
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may direct the order in which the trust property shall be sold, if the property 
consists of several known lots or parcels which can be sold separately. The 
trustee or attorney for the trustee shall follow these directions. 
Robertson questioned the trustee before the sale as to which parcel was being sold 
first and was assured it was the parcel with tax ID 23-051-0004. Robertson learned 
after the sale that the trustee had sold all four parcels as a single parcel and had not 
followed Robertson's directions. (R286) (R 13 61, P23) 
4 THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ROBERTSON'S 
MOTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 
The allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference with the same force and effect as if set forth in full below. 
The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are "( 1) a contract, 
(2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the 
other party, and (4) damages" Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20 ,I 14, 20 
P.3d 388 
It is undisputed that the parties were not in agreement on April 29, 2009. 
(R293, 295) (Addendum II) It is also undisputed that FWB made a written offer to 
Robertson on April 30, 2009 consisting of a single sentence that read: 
"Mike, Upon completion of the new loan documentation, we will reinstate 
your ACH line. Thanks, Dan Brian". (R297) (Addendum III) 
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A copy of this offer was also sent as a CC to Jeff Rounds and Brian Guevera of 
FWB, thus showing intent that this was a final expression of the parties and that at 
least three FWB officers knew of its existence. (R297) (Addendum III) It is also 
~ undisputed that Robertson, upon receiving this offer complied with the terms and 
completed the new loan documentation the following day, May 1, 2009, by signing 
the documents that had been prepared on April 23, 2009. (R42-5 l) Did this 
written agreement constituted the final expression of the parties? 
An integrated agreement is defined as "a writing or writings constituting a 
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 209 (1981 ). 
This was the last writing by FWB and the business loan and note are simply 
addendum with which the contract can be proved. This writing constituted the final 
expression of the parties. Does this offer then form a contract? The formation of a 
contract is spelled out in Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ,-r 24,276 P.3d 1178. 
Generally, formation of a contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. Id. An offer is a "manifestation of willingness to enter into a 
bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to the bargain is invited and will conclude it." Id. "For an offer to be one that 
would create a valid and binding contract, its terms must be definite and 
unambiguous." Id. The obligations of the parties must be "set forth with 
sufficient definiteness that [the contract] can be performed." Id. "An 
acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an objective, 
reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable 
contract has been made."ld. "Consideration is present when there is an act or 
promise given in exchange for the other party's promise."ld. "Thus, 'there is 
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consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee 
suffers a detriment, however slight."' Id. (internal citations omitted) 
Thus the written offer presented by FWB complies with all of the terms of a valid 
contract as found in Cea. The offer pledged the ACH line if Robertson accepted 
the terms of the new loan documentation and entered into them. Both parties 
pledged consideration in the exchange of promises, just as they did in Cea. 
Robertson agreed in these loan documents to provide an initial payment in 
the amount of $100, 461.58 (Rl 129) and then make additional payments to Far 
West in the amount of $4,842.15 beginning on June 5, 2009 and continue until 
May 5, 2014. (R42) Robertson entered into the agreement May 1, 2009 and paid 
the initial payment. (Rl 129) Robertson then made the June 2009 payment as 
agreed and subsequently made each and every payment up to and including the 
September 5, 2010 payment. Robertson was never delinquent on any payment or of 
any amount due during this time. (Rl 76) Far West stipulated that this was correct. 
(R1361, Pl2) 
FWB pledged the restoration of the ACH line. FWB provided those ACH 
services until September 22, 2010 when they withdrew the line. (R299, 462) It is 
undisputed that FWB did so. (R1361, P15-17) This was a breach of the offer made 
to Robertson and the contract the parties entered into. 
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Robertson was damaged when FWB terminated the ACH line. The 
processing of ACH transactions was bringing in a majority of the income 
Robertson used to pay FWB for the agreement the parties had entered into. (R301) 
~ (Rl 361, P28) When FWB stopped that service, the income ceased to exist. 
Robertson was no longer able to make payments to FWB. Instapolypay was no 
longer able to fulfill the needs of its clients and also went out of business. 
This is a prima facie case of breach of contract. No matter how you look at 
it, FWB 's claim that it simply exercised a provision in a previous agreement makes 
no difference, the promise made was to reinstate the ACH line. On September 22, 
2010 the ACH line was no longer reinstated and was terminated. (R299) The 
consideration ceased to exist. The effects of a failure of consideration are spelled 
out in Aquagen Int'!. Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,413 (Utah 1998) 
The formation of a contract "requires a bargain in which there is a 
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration." Id. 
Consideration sufficient to support the formation of a contract requires that 
"a performance or a return promise must be bargained for." Id. 
("Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange 
for a promise .... For the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral 
contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be 
binding on both parties."). Id. 
When one party to a valid contract commits an "uncured material failure" in 
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty to 
continue to perform under the contract. Id. This general rule is based on the 
principle: 
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that where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of 
promises, each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called 
upon to perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the 
expected exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of 
performance by the other party. Id. 
We have unequivocally held in the past that "[e]vidence of failure of 
consideration does not vary or alter the terms of a contract; it attacks the 
very existence of the contract for the purpose of proving it unenforceable." 
Id. In fact, it is entirely permissible for a party to rescind a contract based on 
a failure of consideration. Id. 
"'Failure of consideration [as opposed to lack of consideration] exists 
wherever one who has either given or promised to give some performance 
fails without his fault to receive in some material respect the agreed 
exchange for that performance."' If a failure of consideration occurs, the 
contract ceases to exist. Id. (Internal citations omitted) 
Thus, the contract the parties entered into had been breached or ceased to exist 
when the ACH line was no longer reinstated. 
If this court were to decide that the term "reinstate" in the contract was 
simply a return to the previous agreement with the arbitrary right of termination 
contained in it that would make the consideration pledged illusory. The effect of an 
illusory contract is spelled out in Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7,,fl9,21, 994 P.2d 193 
We have stated that "courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant 
one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to terminate a contract." Id. 
In addition, we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the 
circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract. Id. Moreover, 
where there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and 
equitable result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
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where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is 
no other reasonable interpretation to be given it. Id. 
Consideration may be found when there is any act or forbearance bargained 
for and given in exchange for the promise of another. Id. Whether an act or 
forbearance constitutes consideration for a contract is a question of law that 
we review for correctness. Id. We have held that 
[ f]or the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute 
the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on both 
parties. When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement 
made in such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits 
himself to nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory." An illusory 
promise, neither binds the person making it, nor functions as consideration 
for a return promise. Id. It has also been noted, however, that 
[t]he tendency of the law is to avoid the finding that no contract arose due to 
an illusory promise when it appears that the parties intended a contract. 
Through a process of interpretation, in the absence of express restrictions, 
courts find implied promises to prevent a party's promise from being 
performable merely at the whim of the promisor. Id.(lntemal citations 
omitted) 
Robertson should have been granted summary judgment as a matter of law on the 
breach of contract claim. 
5 THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ROBERTSON'S 
MOTION FOR BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by 
reference with the same force and effect as if set forth in full below. 
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Robertson cited Markham v. Bradley. 2007 UT App 379, ~ 18, 173 P.3d 865 
in determination of what duties each party has under the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. (R1361, P33-36) 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the covenant) 
inheres in every contract. Id. As distinguished from a contract's 
express terms, the covenant "is based on judicially recognized duties 
not found within the four comers of the contract." Id. "Under [the 
covenant], both parties to a contract impliedly promise not to 
intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the 
benefits of the contract." Id. Furthermore, the "covenant ... should 
prevent either party from impeding the other's performance of his 
obligations [under the contract]; and ... one party may not render it 
difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and then 
take advantage of the non-performance he has caused." Id. (Internal 
citation omitted) 
As stated, both parties promise not to intentionally do anything to injure the other 
party or impede their performance or make it difficult or impossible for the other 
party to perform under the contract. It is undisputed that on September 22, 2010, 
FWB terminated the ACH line upon which Robertson generated funds to provide 
satisfaction for the payments under the 2009 Note and Business loan agreement. 
(R299) This injured Robertson's rights and impeded his performance and made it 
difficult or impossible for him to further perform. The ACH was under the total 
control of FWB. In limited circumstances, bad faith is so apparent that it is 
appropriate to decide the issue as a matter of law, as it is in this case. 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 ( 1981) (noting that bad faith 
may be established by "interference with or failure to cooperate in the 
other pai1y' s performance"). 
FWB 's offer to reinstate the ACH line in their enticement to Robe11son to enter 
into the agreement and then the later termination of the ACH was interference with 
and failure to cooperate in Robertson's performance, making it difficult or 
~ impossible for him to perform, and was in bad faith. This is a clear breach under 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Robertson should have been 
granted summary judgment as a matter of law. 
6 THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEEDURES AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
APPLYING SANCTIONS 
On July 2, 20 I 3 a trial was held to determine the amount owed under the terms 
of the Note and Business Loan agreement entered into by Robertson on May 1, 
2009 and the value of the property on the date of the foreclosure sale June 1, 2011. 
(Rl362) 
At the beginning of the trial, in opening arguments, Robertson asked for 
clarification as to what evidence he may present in regards to these two subjects. 
vJ The district court instructed Robertson, "But as far as the issues that are remaining, 
the Court's plenty willing to let you put on all the evidence you want." (R1362, 
P 11-12) Based upon the directions of the Court, Robertson did not object to any of 
the exhibits or the expert witness presented by FWB believing that he would be 
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allowed to present "all the evidence" he wanted to impeach those exhibits and the 
testimony of the witnesses. Robertson was greatly surprised when an attempt to do 
so was suppressed by the district court and Robe11son was not allowed to present 
any of the evidence he had prepared in an effort to impeach. 
Under the language of Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that 
existed at the filing of this case, (Addendum V) Robertson falls under the 
exemption of (a)(2)(A)(vi) and so the requirements of subdivision (a)(l) and 
subdivision (f) do not apply to him. (Rl 106) The requirements for pretrial 
disclosure read, 
(a)( 4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following 
information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely 
for impeachment: 
This rule has an exception for evidence to which a party need not disclose to the 
other party prior to trial, and that is "other than solely for impeachment". The 
evidence Robertson was attempting to introduce was evidence solely for 
impeachment. Robertson fully believed that according to the language of this rule, 
he was not required to produce it and was only to present it in an effort to impeach 
at trial. 
Rule 26(a)(4) states: "A party shall provide to other parties the 
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at 
trial other than solely for impeachment." Utah R.Civ. P. 26(a)(4) 
( emphasis added). Impeachment of a witness is defined as the act of 
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"discredit[ing] the veracity of a witness." Black's Law Dictionary 768 
(8th ed. l 999)(parentheses omitted). Similarly, "impeachment 
evidence" is defined as " [ e ]vidence used to undermine a witness's 
credibility." Id. at 597. Thus, by the rule's plain meaning, witnesses 
need not be disclosed if the sole purpose of their testimony is to call 
into question the "veracity" or "credibility" of another witness. 
Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs .• LLC, 2006 UT App 
516, ,I 29, 154 P.3d 852. 
Under cross examination ofFWB's expet1 witness, Travis Reeves, Robertson 
questioned the four properties used as comparable property sales as to their distant 
location from the subject property, stale sales dates and inferior nature. (Rl362, 
P66- l 04) When asked if there were other property sales that were closer in time 
and location to these sales the witness stated, "Not that I'm aware of, no," (RI 362, 
P7 l) Upon further questioning the witness admitted that the properties he chose 
were all inferior in location to the subject property. (RI 362, P75) When asked if it 
xP would be better to have property sales to compare that were similar the witness 
answered "Yes" and when asked if he would like to see them answered "I would 
be interested in seeing the parcels." (Rl362, P76) Robertson then attempted to 
present the evidence and FWB objected. The court asked "Was it in your 
disclosures?" to which Robertson stated it was not but was for impeachment 
purposes. (Rl362, P77) After a discussion with FWB about the non disclosure the 
court ruled, "Okay, Well, I'm not allow-I'm not going to allow you to use it." 
(Rl362, P78) 
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However, "[b ]efore a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under 
rule 3 7, the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party 
willfulness, bad faith, ... fault, or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating 
the judicial process." Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 
171, ,r 9,235 P.3d 791. 
There was no ruling by the district court that Robertson was a part of any 
willfulness, bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial 
process before the Court imposed sanctions. Several times Robertson tried to 
present evidence to impeach the credibility and conclusions of the expert and each 
time was denied because of failure to disclose. (R1362, P79, 82, 83, 84, 97) 
Sanctions are warranted when "( 1) the party's behavior was willful; 
(2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some 
fault to the party; or ( 4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory 
tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. Kilpatrick v. Bullough 
Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, ,r 25, 199 P.3d 957 
Robertson's lack of disclosure was a direct result of the language of the 
discovery rules as he understood them. He felt he was in full compliance and thus 
Robertson had good cause and acted in good faith. Nevertheless, all of the 
materials Robertson attempted to present were materials available to anyone in the 
public domain. Nothing was privileged and FWB had already shown by the 
materials they had presented in discovery that they were well aware of this 
information before Robertson attempted to enter it. Moreover, the witness had a 
fiduciary duty to seek out this information in his capacity as an appraiser. If there 
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would have been any error, it would have been harmless. Robertson should have 
been allowed to present evidence of impeachment at trial. The district court abused 
its discretion when it imposed sanctions against Robertson. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courts grant of partial summary judgment to Appellee was 
unfounded. Appellant has presented many questions of material fact as to the 
nature of the contract, the circumstances under which it was made and the purpose 
~ to which the parties entered into it. Many times the Appellee changed the nature of 
their agreement over the course of their dealings and each time the Appellant 
v; performed as agreed and with exactness. The Appellee continually breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their agreements for their own 
betterment at the expense of the Appellant, never considering the consequence of 
their actions upon the Appellant, and finally attempting to take away everything 
the Appellant ever had or hoped for by putting him out of business, taking away 
the rights to the property he had obtained, and obtaining a deficiency judgment for 
more than he had even borrowed. 
Humbly, the Appellant petitions this Court that the trial court's grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of the Appellee should be summarily reversed, 
and summary judgment granted in favor of the Appellant as a matter of law. 
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Furthermore, the Appellant asks that the foreclosure sale should be set aside. This 
would be the right and just thing to do under these circumstances. The Law is 
designed to be fair. The Law is to be tempered with justice and mercy. Wrong-
doing should not be rewarded. It is never merciful to destroy an individual so that 
a company, who was underhanded and deceitful can prevail. Appellant's only 
desire is that the right thing be done. This court has the power to ensure that 
justice and mercy be accomplished. 
Therefore, The Appellant asks that the Court reverse the partial summary 
judgment granted for the Appellee and grant summary judgment for the Appellant, 
or, in the alternative, that the Court grant the Appellant a right to a new trial in 
which the Appellant is allowed the right to present all the evidence for the district 
court to consider with which to make a decision. 
Dated this g day of September, 2015 
Mike L. Robertson 
Pro Se 
Appellant/Defendant 
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ADDENDUM I 
Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion for New Trail 
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Mike L. Robertson 
S44N 880E 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone (801 )S92-7674 
Email megus@usa.com 
FILED 
MAY 2 7 2015 ~ 
4TH DISTRICT 
STA1E Of UTAH 
UTAHCOUNIY 
IN THE POURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE or UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
FAR. WEST BANK, a division of 
America West Bank, 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, 
VS. 
MIKEL. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 110402516 
Judge David Mortensen 
Defendant Mike L. Robertson's (Robertson) Motion for New Trial came before the Court 
at a hearing on December 9, 2013 at 2:00p.m. Far West Bank, now known as American West 
Bank (American West), was represented by Jonathan A. Dibble and Steven W. Call of Ray 
Quinny & Nebeker P.C. Defendant Robertson appeared pro se. 
The Court having considered the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and having heard the 
argument of Plaintifrs counsel and Defendant Robertson. hereby makes its findings and 
conclusions and order denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial as follows: 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. On September 11, 2013, the Court entered a money Judgment against Defendant Robertson 
in favor of American West after a one-day trial held July 2, 2013 pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§ 57-1-32. 
2. The Judgment entered against Defendant Robertson was based on a deficiency balance owing 
by Defendant Robertson on a consolidated commercial loan after the foreclosure _of a parcel 
of land that secun:d the loan. 
3. On September 12, 2013, Defendant Robertson filed his Motion for New Trial which was 
supported by a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. ("support 
memorandum"). 
4. Defendant Robertson's support memorandum was accompanied by the Second Declaration 
of Mike L. Robertson. 
5. On September 30, 2013, American West filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant 
Robertson's support memorandum. 
6. On September 30,2013, American West also objected to and moved the Court to strike or 
disregard the Second Declaration of Defendant Robertson on the growids the post-trial 
declaration was inadmissible under the Utah Rules ofEvidence and Rules of Civil Procedure 
on various grounds. 
7. The Court read all of the pleadings and considered all the arguments and believed that a fair 
trial was had in this matter and that fair notice was given of the Court's expectations. 
8. AJi to the motion to strike, it was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted insofar as 
the statement of Defendant Robertson could be construed as an attempt to supplement the 
iecord as to the initial summary judgment motion. 
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9. The Court found that Rule 59 is a proper procedural rule to ask a court after judgment's been 
entered to look at a motion for summary judgment as to a legal remedy and that an affidavit 
can be filed in support of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. 
I 0. The Defendant Robertson's Motion for New Trial was denied, both as it pertains to the 
summary judgment motion and the trial proceedings in this case. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and other findings and conclusions 
placed upon the record, IT IS HEREBY: 
ORDERED that Defendant Robertson's Motion for New Trial is DENIED, both as it 
pertains to the summary judgment motion and the trial proceedings. 
Approved as to form by: 
Steven W Call 
Jonathan A Dibble 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C 
Dated this __ day of April, 201 S 
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ADDENDUM II 
NEGOTIATION EMAILS 
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----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian Guevara" 
To: "'Mike Robertson"' 
Subject: Loan Extension 
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2009 13 :02:38 -0700 
Mike, 
We are ready to get this extension signed. Let me know when you are available to sign. We can 
sign at the Provo office. 
A few item: 
We will need to get a copy of your entity papers for Round Peak. 
The total amount needed in cash at the signing will be $100,461.58 
-$80,000 Pay down 
-$9,713.43 Interest for loan 549 
-$7, 137.15 Interest for loan 089 
-$3,382 Loan Fee 
-$79 Tax Tracking 
-$150 Doc Prep Fee 
$100,461.58 Total 
Let me know if you have any question. Thanks. Brian 
Brian Guevara 
Commercial Lending 
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From: Mike Robertson [mailto:megus@usa.com] 
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2009 3:42 PM 
To: Brian Guevara 
Subject: Re: Loan Extension 
Brian, 
How did we get $5000. more interest in only a month??? 
Also, what interest rate are we talking? 
I have the $95,000 right now, I'll have to come up with the other $5,000. 
And I thought we were going to eliminate the fee? 
Mike 
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian Guevara" 
To: "'Mike Robertson"' 
Subject: RE: Loan Extension 
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 07:34:31 -0700 
Answers are below. Let me know if you have further questions. Brian 
Brian Guevara 
From: Mike Robertson [mailto:megus@usa.com] 
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2009 3:42 PM 
To: Brian Guevara 
Subject: Re: Loan Extension 
Brian, 
How did we get $5000. more interest in only a month??? 
-I am not sure when or what number you got. But your daily interest on each loan is below and 
the numbers are accurate. 
Loan 089- $29.5139 
Loan 549- $58.9955 
Also, what interest rate are we talking? 
-This is a 6% fixed rate as we discussed. 
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I have the $95,000 right now, I'll have to come up with the other $5,000. 
And I thought we were going to eliminate the fee? 
-We were able to lower the fee from 1 % to½%. 
Mike 
From: Mike Robertson [mailto:megus@usa.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 11:17 AM 
To: Brian Guevara 
Subject: RE: Loan Extension 
OK Brian, I can see the difference. Before, they were going to role the fees into the loan, your 
putting them up front. 
That's the difference in the amount I was thinking. 
On the interest rate though, we were talking 5.5% fixed or 5% variable in the meeting we had, 
why is it 6% now? 
And I have another problem that has just come up and I talked to Dan about it a little. They are 
canceling my agreement to process ACH transactions on the 20th of next month. Dan said it was 
because I was in this delinquent category and they had to look at all aspects of my business 
dealings. Can we get an agreement to re-instate that at the same time we finalize this? 
Mike 
From: 
To: 
Date: 
"Brian Guevara" <BGuevara@farwestbank.com> 
"'Mike Robertson"' <megus@usa.com> 
Apr 29, 2009 I I :39: I 3 AM 
On the rate. We did discuss the 5.5% fixed rate but said we would need to go back and plug in 
the numbers and see where it came out at. When I plugged in the numbers, 6% fixed was the 
lowest fixed rate we could do. I was under the assumption that you didn't want to go variable. 
But, if you want to, the rate would be P+2% (currently 5.25%) with a floor of 5.5%. 
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On the J\CI-1 issue ... it is my understanding that we will be able to re-instate that for you at the 
time of closing. 
Brian Guevara 
Commercial Lending 
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian Guevara" 
To: '"Mike Robertson"' 
Subject: Loan Extension 
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 13:47:35 -0700 
Mike, 
We are hoping to get this closed by month end. ls there a time tomorrow when we can get this 
signed? Thanks. Brian 
Brian Guevara 
Commercial Lending 
From: Mike Robertson [mailto:megus@usa.com] 
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 10:53 AM 
To: Brian Guevara 
Subject: Re: Loan Extension 
Brian, 
Can we do it about 4:30 today? And can I get something in writing that we will re-instate the 
ACH service with the signing of this? 
Mike 
From: 
"Brian Guevara" <BGuevara@farwestbank.com> 
To: 
"'Mike Robertson"' <megus@usa.com> 
Date: 
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Apr 30, 2009 I: 18:49 PM 
I am not able to meet this afternoon at 4:30. How about tomorrow morning sometime? Thanks. 
Brian 
Brian Guevara 
Commercial Lending 
From: 
"Brian Guevara" <BGuevara@farwestbank.com> 
To: 
"'Mike Robertson"' <megus@usa.com> 
Date: 
May 1, 2009 8:38: 19 AM 
Mike, 
One more item I need you to bring to the closing today ... partnership papers for Round Peak. 
Thanks. I'll see you this afternoon. Brian 
Brian Guevara 
Commercial Lending 
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ADDENDUM III 
AGREEMENT 
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l) 
lii}ail.com 
Robertson ACH Line 
From: 
"Dan Brian" <DBrian@farwestbank.com> 
To: 
'"Mike Robertson"' <megus@usa.com> 
Cc: 
"Brian Guevara" <BGuevara@farwestbank.com>, "Jeff Rounds" 
<JRounds@farwestbank.com> 
Date: 
Apr 30, 2009 2:57:56 PM 
Mike, 
Upon completion of the new loan documentation, we will reinstate your ACH line. 
Thanks, 
Dan Brian 
Far West Bank, a division of AmericanWest Bank, Spokane, Wa. 
10757 South River Front Parkway, Suite 150 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Phone: 801-208-4079 
Fax: 801-208-3486 
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information. If you are not the 
intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return e-mail, delete this e-mail and destroy 
any copies. Any dissemination or use of this information by a person other than the intended recipient is 
unauthorized and may be illegal. 
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• 
ADDENDUM IV 
UCA51-1-23 
f 
UCA 51-1-24 
UCA51-1-25 
UCA 51-1-26 
UCA51-1-27 
UCA 51-1-31.5 
• 
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57-1-23. Sale of trust property -- Power of trustee -- Foreclosure of trust 
deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is 
given the power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust 
property to be sold in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a 
breach of an obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at 
the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of 
sale may be exercised by the trustee without express provision for it in the trust 
deed. 
Amended by Chapter 236, 2001 General Session 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee -- Notice of default. 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under 
Subsection 57-1-2l(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until: 
( 1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of each 
county where the trust property or some part or parcel of the trust property is 
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the name of the 
trustor named in the trust deed and giving the book and page, or the recorder's 
entry number, where the trust deed is recorded and a legal description of the trust 
property, and containing a statement that a breach of an obligation for which the 
trust property was conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature 
of that breach and of the trustee's election to sell or cause to be sold the property to 
satisfy the obligation; 
(2) not less than three months has elapsed from the time the trustee filed for 
record under Subsection (I); and 
~ (3) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice of 
sale as provided in Sections 57-1-25 and 57-1-26. 
Amended by Chapter 236, 2001 General Session 
75 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale -- Description of property -- Time and place 
of sale. 
(I) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale 
particularly describing the property to be sold: 
(a) by publication of the notice: 
(i) (A) at least three times; 
(B) once a week for three consecutive weeks; 
(C) the last publication to be at least IO days but not more than 30 days 
before the date the sale is scheduled; and 
(D) in a newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the 
property to be sold, or some part of the property to be sold, is situated; and ~ 
(ii) in accordance with Section 45-1-101 for 30 days before the date the sale 
is scheduled; 
(b) by posting the notice: 
(i) at least 20 days before the date the sale is scheduled; and 
(ii) (A) in some conspicuous place on the property to be sold; and 
(B) at the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust 
property, or some part of it, is located; and 
(c) if the stated purpose of the obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security is to finance residential rental property: 
(i) by posting the notice, including the statement required under Subsection 
(3)(b): 
(A) on the primary door of each dwelling unit on the property to be sold, if 
the property to be sold has fewer than nine dwelling units; or 
(B) in at least two conspicuous places on the property to be sold, in addition 
to the posting required under Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(A), if the property to be sold has 
nine or more dwelling units; or 
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(ii) by mailing the notice, including the statement required under 
Subsection (3)(b ), to the occupant of each dwelling unit on the property to be sold. 
(2) (a) The sale shall be held at the time and place designated in the notice 
of sale. 
(b) The time of sale shall be between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
( c) The place of sale shall be clearly identified in the notice of sale under 
Subsection (I) and shall be at a courthouse serving the county in which the 
property to be sold, or some part of the property to be sold, is located. 
(3) (a) The notice of sale shall be in substantially the following form: 
Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the 
highest bidder, payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale, at 
(insert location ofsale) _______ on ____ (month\day\year), at 
_.m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed originally executed by 
__ (and __ , his wife,) as trustors, in favor of __ , covering real property 
located at __ , and more particularly described as: 
(Insert legal description) 
4" The current beneficiary of the trust deed is __________ and 
the record owners of the property as of the recording of the notice of default are 
and 
-------- ---------
Dated 
____ (month\day\year). 
Trustee 
(b) If the stated purpose of the obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security is to finance residential rental property, the notice required under 
Subsection ( 1 )( c) shall include a statement, in at least 14-point font, substantially 
as follows: 
"Notice to Tenant 
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As stated in the accompanying Notice of Trustee's Sale, this property is 
scheduled to be sold at public auction to the highest bidder unless the default in the 
obligation secured by this property is cured. If the property is sold, you may be 
allowed under federal law to continue to occupy your rental unit until your rental 
agreement expires, or until 90 days after the date you are served with a notice to 
vacate, whichever is later. If your rental or lease agreement expires after the 90-day 
period, you may need to provide a copy of your rental or lease agreement to the 
new owner to prove your right to remain on the property longer than 90 days after 
the sale of the property. 
You must continue to pay your rent and comply with other requirements of 
your rental or lease agreement or you will be subject to eviction for violating your 
rental or lease agreement. 
The new owner or the new owner's representative will probably contact you 
after the property is sold with directions about where to pay rent. 
The new owner of the property may or may not want to offer to enter into a 
new rental or lease agreement with you at the expiration of the period described 
above." 
(4) The failure to provide notice as required under Subsections (l)(c) and 
(3 )(b) or a defect in that notice may not be the basis for challenging or invaliding a 
trustee's sale. 
(5) A trustee qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) who 
exercises a power of sale has a duty to the trustor not to defraud, or conspire or 
scheme to defraud, the trustor. 
Amended by Chapter 228, 2011 General Session 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and notice of sale -- Mailing 
by trustee or beneficiary -- Publication of notice of default -- Notice to parties 
of trust deed. 
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any 
notice of sale under any trust deed shall file for record a duly acknowledged 
request for a copy of any notice of default and notice of sale: 
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(i) in the office of the county recorder of any county in which the trust 
property or any part of the trust property is situated; and 
(ii) at any time: 
(A) subsequent to the filing for record of the trust deed; and 
(B) prior to the filing for record of a notice of default. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the request described in 
Subsection (1 )(a) may not be included in any other recorded instrument. 
( c) The request described in Subsection (I)( a) shall: 
(i) set forth the name and address of the one or more persons requesting 
copies of the notice of default and the notice of sale; and 
(ii) identify the trust deed by stating: 
(A) the names of the original parties to the trust deed; 
(B) the date of filing for record of the trust deed; 
( C) (I) the book and page where the trust deed is recorded; or 
(II) the recorder's entry number; and 
(D) the legal description of the trust property. 
( d) The request described in Subsection ( 1 )( a) shall be in substantially the 
~ following form: 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
The undersigned requests that a copy of any notice of default and a copy of 
notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record _____ (month\day\year), 
and recorded in Book __ , Page __ , Records of __ County, (or filed for 
record _____ (month\day\year), with recorder's entry number __ , __ _ 
County), Utah, executed by __ and ________ as trustors, in which 
__ is named as beneficiary and __ as trustee, be mailed to __ (insert name) 
__ at __ (insert address) ____ _ 
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(Insert legal description) 
Signature ________ _ 
(Certificate of Acknowledgement) 
( e) If a request for a copy of a notice of default and notice of sale is filed 
for record under this section, the recorder shall index the request in: 
(i) the mortgagor's index; 
(ii) mortgagee's index; and 
(iii) abstract record. 
(f) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the trustee under any deed of trust 
is not required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any person not filing a 
request for notice as described in this Subsection ( 1 ). 
(2) (a) Not later than 10 days after recordation of a notice of default, the 
trustee or beneficiary shall mail a signed copy of the notice of default: 
(i) by certified or registered mail, with postage prepaid; 
(ii) with the recording date shown; 
(iii) addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a 
request that has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of default; 
and 
(iv) directed to the address designated in the request. 
(b) At least 20 days before the date of sale, the trustee shall mail a signed 
copy of the notice of the time and place of sale: 
(i) by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, with postage 
prepaid; 
(ii) addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a 
request that has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of default; 
and 
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(iii) directed to the address designated in the request. 
(3) (a) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of 
default and a copy of any notice of sale under the trust deed be mailed to any 
person who is a party to the trust deed at the address of the person set forth in the 
trust deed. 
(b) A copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed 
to any person requesting the notice who is a party to the trust deed at the same time 
and in the same manner required in Subsection (2) as though a separate request had 
been filed by each person as provided in Subsection ( l) except that a trustee shall 
include with a signed copy of a notice of default and the signed copy of a notice of 
sale the following information current as of the time the notice of default and the 
notice of sale is provided: 
(i) the name of the trustee; 
(ii) the mailing address of the trustee; 
(iii) if the trustee maintains a bona fide office in the state meeting the 
requirements of Subsection 57-1-21 (1 )(b ), the address of a bona fide office of the 
trustee meeting the requirements of Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(b ); 
(iv) the hours during which the trustee can be contacted regarding the 
notice of default and notice of sale, which hours shall include the period during 
~ regular business hours in a regular business day; and 
( v) a telephone number that the person may use to contact the trustee during 
the hours described in Subsection (3)(b)(iv). 
( 4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request 
for notice by the trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, no later than 
15 days after the filing for record of the notice of default, a copy of the notice of 
default shall be: 
(a) mailed to the address of the property described in the notice of default; 
or 
(b) posted on the property~ 
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( 5) The following shall not affect the title to trust property or be considered 
notice to any person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of 
notice of sale has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the 
trust property: 
(a) a request for a copy of any notice filed for record under Subsection (1) 
or (3); 
(b) any statement or allegation in any request described in Subsection 
(5)(a); or 
(c) any record of a request described in Subsection (5)(a). 
Amended by Chapter 209,. 2002 General Session 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public auction -- Postponement of sale. 
( 1) (a) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of 
sale, the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public 
auction to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may 
conduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or the trustor's successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust property shall 
be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or parcels which can be sold 
separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall follow these directions. Any 
person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. The trustee may 
bid for the beneficiary. Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer. If the highest 
bidder refuses to pay the amount bid by the highest bidder for the property, the 
trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, shall either: 
(i) renotice the sale in the same manner as notice of the original sale is 
required to be given; or 
(ii) sell the property to the next highest bidder. 
(b) A bidder refusing to pay the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned 
by the refusal, including interest, costs, and trustee's and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of that 
person for the property. 
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(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers 
expedient, postpone the sale. The person conducting the sale shall give notice of 
each postponement by public declaration, by written notice or oral postponement, 
at the time and place last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed 
sale is required, unless the postponement exceeds 45 days. In that event, the sale 
shall be renoticed in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be 
given. 
Amended by Chapter 236, 2001 General Session 
57-1-31.5. Reinstatement or payoff statement -- Timeliness of request --
Trustee's duty to provide statement -- Statement to include accounting of costs 
and fees. 
( 1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Approved delivery method" means delivery by: 
(i) certified or registered United States mail with return receipt requested; 
or 
(ii) a nationally recognized letter or package delivery or courier service 
operating_ in the state that provides a service for: 
(A) tracking the delivery of an item; or 
(B) documenting: 
(I) that the item was received by the intended recipient; or 
(II) a refusal to accept delivery of the item. 
(b) "Compensation" means anything of economic value that is paid, loaned, 
granted, given, donated, or transferred to a trustee for or in consideration of: 
(i) services; 
(ii) personal or real property; or 
(iii) other thing of value. 
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(c) "Interested party" means a person with a right under Subsection 57-1-
31 ( 1) to reinstate an obligation secured by a trust deed. 
( d) "Payoff statement" means a statement under Subsection (2) that an 
interested party requests in order to obtain the amount required to pay off a loan 
secured by a trust deed. 
(e) "Reinstatement statement" means a statement under Subsection (2) that 
an interested party requests in order to obtain the amount required under 
Subsection 57-1-31(1) to reinstate an obligation secured by a trust deed. 
(2) (a) (i) An interested party may submit a written request to a trustee for a ~ 
statement of the amount required to be paid: 
(A) to reinstate an obligation secured by a trust deed; or 
(B) to pay off a loan secured by a trust deed. 
(ii) (A) A request for a reinstatement statement is not timely unless the 
trustee receives the request at least 10 business days before expiration of the three-
month period under Section 57-1-31 to reinstate an obligation. 
(B) A request for a payoff statement is not timely unless the trustee receives 
the request at least 10 business days before the trustee's sale. 
(iii) An interested party submitting a reinstatement statement or payoff 
statement to a trustee shall submit the statement to the trustee: 
(A) at the address specified in the trust deed for notices to the trustee; or 
(B) at an alternate address approved by the trustee for delivery of mail or 
notices. 
(iv) A trustee is considered to have received a request submitted under 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) if: 
(A) the interested party submitted the request through an approved delivery 
method; and 
(B) documentation provided under the approved delivery method indicates 
that: 
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(I) the request was delivered to the trustee; or 
(II) delivery of the request was refused. 
(b) (i) A trustee who receives a written request under Subsection (2)(a) 
shall provide the statement to the interested party. 
(ii) A trustee is considered to have provided the statement requested under 
Subsection (2)(a) on the date that the trustee deposits the statement with an 
approved delivery method: 
(A) with all delivery costs prepaid; and 
(B) addressed to the interested party at the address provided in the request. 
( c) (i) If the trustee provides a requested reinstatement statement later than 
five business days after the request is received, the time to reinstate under Section 
57-1-31 is tolled from the date of the request to the date that the trustee provides 
the statement. 
(ii) If, after scheduling a trustee's sale, the trustee fails to provide a 
requested payoff statement within five business days after the request is received, 
the trustee shall: 
(A) cancel the trustee's sale; or 
(B) postpone the trustee's sale to a date at least 10 business days after the 
trustee provides the statement. 
(3) A trustee shall include with each statement required under Subsection 
(2)(a): 
(a) a detailed listing of any of the following that the trustor would be 
required to pay to reinstate or payoff the loan: 
(i) attorney fees; 
(ii) trustee fees; or 
(iii) any costs including: 
(A) title fees; 
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(B) publication fees; or 
( C) posting fees; and 
(b) subject to Subsection ( 4 ), a disclosure of: 
(i) any relationship that the trustee has with a third party that provides 
services related to the foreclosure of the loan; and 
(ii) whether the relationship described in Subsection (3)(b )(i) is created by: 
(A) an ownership interest in the third party; or 
(B) contract or other agreement. 
( 4) Subsection (3 )(b) does not require a trustee to provide a trustor: 
(a) a copy of any contract or agreement described in Subsection (3 )(b ); 
(b) specific detail as to the nature of the ownership interest described in 
Subsection (3)(b ); or 
( c) the amount of compensation the trustee receives related to the 
foreclosure of the loan under a relationship described in Subsection (3 )(b ). 
Amended by Chapter 24, 2010 General Session 
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ADDENDUMV 
URCP26 
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)( 1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting 
a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
( a)( 1 )(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or 
defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(a)( 1 )(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable 
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible 
things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or 
defenses, unless solely for impeachment; 
(a)(l)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such computation 
is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; 
and 
(a)(l)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement 
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy 
part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or 
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(l) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of 
the parties under subdivision (t). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties shall make 
these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial 
disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is not excused 
from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the 
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another 
party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
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(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)( 1) and subdivision (f) do not apply 
to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is 
$20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making 
proceedings of an. administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
\@ (a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not 
represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(l) 
are subject to discovery under subpart (b ). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may 
be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this 
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to 
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party 
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report 
prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject 
matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for 
each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be 
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years. 
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(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the 
expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision ( d) or, if the evidence is 
intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter 
identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the 
disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)( 4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the fol lowing 
information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for 
impeachment: 
( a)( 4 )(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone 
number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to 
present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)( 4 )(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented 
by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the 
pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
( a)( 4 )(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects 
to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 
days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve 
and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a 
deposition designated by another party under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any 
objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility 
of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other 
than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be 
deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by 
the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1 ), (3) and ( 4) shall be made in writing, 
signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one 
or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written 
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission 
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to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical 
and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in 
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b )( 1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b )(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from 
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. The party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not 
reasonably accessible, describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, 
the nature of the information not provided, and any other information that will 
enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel discovery or for a 
protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the 
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that 
showing is made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the 
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of subsection 
(b )(3 ). The court may specify conditions for the discovery. 
(b )(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set 
forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; 
(b )(3 )(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in 
the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(b )(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, 
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon 
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its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision 
(c). 
(b )( 4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b )(5) 
of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things 
otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b )( 1) of this rule and prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other 1;; 
party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery 
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the 
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action 
or its subject matter previously made by that patty. Upon request, a person not a 
party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action 
or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the 
person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)( 4) apply to the 
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this 
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or 
otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, 
mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a 
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and 
contemporaneously recorded. 
(b )(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert 
whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision 
(a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is 
provided. 
(b )(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has 
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or 
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only 
as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under 
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which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions 
on the same subject by other means. 
(b )(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b )(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the pai1y seeking discovery pay the expert 
a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b )(5) 
of this rule; and 
(b)(S)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(S)(A) of this 
rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under 
Subdivision (b)(S)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking 
discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably 
incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(b )( 6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b )( 6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise 
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to 
protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly 
and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not 
produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself 
privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the 
privilege or protection. 
(b )( 6)(B) Information produced. If infonnation is produced in discovery that is 
subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the 
party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the 
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not 
use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may 
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the 
claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it 
must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the 
information until the claim is resolved. 
( c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to 
resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in 
which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
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court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
( c )( 1) that the discovery not be had; 
( c )(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place; 
( c )(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that 
selected by the party seeking discovery; 
( c )( 4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated 
by the court; 
( c )( 6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
( c )(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
( c )(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on 
such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or 
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision 
(a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the 
parties or ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be 
completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the court upon 
motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, 
orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact 
that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
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( e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under 
subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a 
duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information thereafter 
acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances: 
( e )( 1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures 
under subdivision ( a) if the party learns that in some material respect the 
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective 
information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 
discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony of an expert from whom 
a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to 
information contained in the report and to information provided through a 
deposition of the expert. 
( e )(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an 
interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if the party learns 
that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the 
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the 
other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
~ ( f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as 
otherwise stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)( 1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, 
meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and 
defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange 
for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)( 1 ), to discuss any issues relating to 
preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. 
Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys of record shall be 
present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery 
plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for 
disclosures under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures 
under subdivision (a)(l) were made or will be made; 
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(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should 
be completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether 
discovery should be limited to pa1iicular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or fonns in which it should be 
produced; 
(f)(2)(0) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such 
claims after production - whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an 
order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed 
under these rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for 
allocating fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting 
and in any event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed 
form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The 
proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 
16(b )( 1 )-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial 
conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the 
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery 
plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for 
entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. 
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules 
shall govern any subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
( f)( 4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order 
under Rule 16(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated 
discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or 
motion a modification of the discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion 
shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder. 
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(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for 
discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose 
address shall be stated. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a 
certification that the person has read the request, response, or objection and that to 
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is: ( 1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation; and (3) not unreasonable or 
unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery 
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall 
not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its 
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party 
on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or 
proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, 
in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such 
action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a 
subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of 
the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to be taken resides 
or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during the taking of 
such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall 
be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)( 1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or 
requests for discovery with the comt, but shall file only the original certificate of 
service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on 
the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a 
party shall not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall 
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file only the original certificate of service stating that the response has been served 
on the other patties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 30(f)( 1 ), 
Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed 
with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) 
shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which 
is at issue. 
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ADDENDUM VI 
URCP56 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A paity seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 21 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
( d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial 
is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
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party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
patty opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
~ the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
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